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MEREDITH L. BAKER

Lying to Get a Court-Appointed Attorney Is Not an
Obstruction of Justice
ABSTRACT
The United States Sentencing Guidelines provides the starting place for
courts sentencing individuals convicted of federal crimes. Under § 3C1.1 of
the Guidelines, offenders can receive a two-level increase in their offense level
for obstructing or impeding the administration of justice. The Fourth, Fifth,
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that this increase for obstruction
applies to defendants who lie about their assets to obtain a court-appointed
attorney. In reaching this decision, these courts have focused on the
materiality of the lies and the examples of obstruction set forth in the
commentary to § 3C1.1. The Second Circuit, though, has held that the
adjustment does not apply to these offenders because the adjustment requires
an intent to obstruct justice, not merely an intent to deceive the court. This
circuit split raises the question of whether there is a difference between
obstruction of justice and obstruction of the justice system. Because
application of the adjustment can have a significant effect on an offender’s
overall sentence, this split should be resolved so that sentences are no longer
disparately harsh in certain circuits. The examples in the commentary
to § 3C1.1 do not provide conclusive evidence of whether the adjustment
applies to particular behavior, so courts should focus on the language
of § 3C1.1 and construe it so that it does not apply to offenders who lie to
obtain court-appointed counsel. This interpretation accords with an
understanding of justice as a concept distinct from the concept of the justice
system.
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COMMENT
LYING TO GET A COURT-APPOINTED ATTORNEY IS NOT AN
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
Meredith L. Baker†
I. INTRODUCTION
What is obstruction of justice? While there are various forms of
obstruction of justice in today’s criminal law,1 the United States Sentencing
Guidelines contains its own version of obstruction in the form of a sentence
adjustment.2 Consequently, many people today are punished for obstruction
of justice without being convicted of it—and courts do not always agree on
what conduct constitutes obstruction. If a defendant wants to obtain a courtappointed attorney and thus lies about his assets to appear indigent, that lie
can be considered obstruction in the Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuits but will fall outside the sentence adjustment in the Second Circuit.3
Thus, under a sentencing system that was supposed to foster uniformity,4
sentences for the same conduct can differ depending on where the defendant
committed the underlying offense. This Comment proposes a resolution of
this circuit split in favor of the Second Circuit’s more limited view of
obstruction of justice.

†
Senior Staff, LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, Volume 16; J.D. Candidate, Liberty
University School of Law (2022). I would like to thank my parents, Julia and the late Larry
Baker, as well as all of my siblings, Hannah, Landon, Abigail, Olivia, Rachel, and Jonathan,
for their love and support that have made law school possible. I would also like to thank
Clint Hamilton for his help with this Comment, particularly in formulating the question at
the heart of this circuit split.
1
Juliana DeVries, 20 Years for Clearing Your Browser History?, 22 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L.
13, 17 (2017).
2
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018). The Guidelines
also uses the term “enhancement” to refer to the sentence adjustment for obstruction, and
courts have used this term. See id. § 3C1.1 cmt. n.3. For consistency’s sake, the term
“adjustment” is used in this Comment.
3
See United States v. Khimchiachvili, 372 F.3d 75, 82–83 (2d. Cir. 2004); United States v.
Iverson, 874 F.3d 855, 857 (5th Cir. 2017); United States v. Hernandez-Ramirez, 254 F.3d
841, 842 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Ruff, 79 F.3d 123, 126 (11th Cir. 1996) (per
curiam); United States v. Westmoreland, 72 F. App’x 29, 31 (4th Cir. 2003) (per curiam).
4
Brent E. Newton & Dawinder S. Sidhu, The History of the Original United States
Sentencing Commission, 1985-1987, 45 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1167, 1184–85 (2017).
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II. BACKGROUND
A.

The Federal Sentencing Guidelines

Today, many people convicted of federal crimes are sentenced under a
system instituted in 1987.5 Before that time, federal sentencing was vastly
different from what it is today.6 Federal judges exercised great discretion in
sentencing, which led to disparate sentences across the country for the same
offenses.7 Good behavior credits and the parole system, which at first
operated without any fixed guidelines, compounded the disparate treatment.8
For many inmates, parole was available after they served a third of their
sentence.9 Knowledge of that fact incentivized judges to impose harsher
sentences—but the possibility of parole was not guaranteed parole, so
sentences remained disparate.10 Sentencing courts could consider numerous
factors, such as employment and family status, which may have compounded
the problem by skewing sentences to favor people of a higher socioeconomic
status.11 Furthermore, Congress wanted to not only fix disparity but also get
tougher on crime.12 In a bipartisan effort, Congress passed the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984,13 which created a Sentencing Commission and charged
it with promulgating sentencing guidelines.14
The Sentencing Commission considered both current average sentences
for various crimes and theories of punishment, but it was the average
sentences, along with the relatively recent parole guidelines, that largely
influenced the first Sentencing Guidelines.15 The Commission crafted a gridlike structure, with offense levels on one axis and prior criminal history levels
on the other axis.16 The Commission eliminated consideration of most
offender characteristics, including employment, and instead focused on the

5
Id. at 1168, 1200. See generally FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d); 3 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 521 (4th ed. 2021).
6
Newton & Sidhu, supra note 4, at 1169.
7
Id. at 1169, 1174, 1178–80.
8
Id. at 1170–74.
9
Id. at 1171.
10
Id. at 1173–74.
11
Id. at 1240–42, 1241 n.520, 1242 n.521.
12
Newton & Sidhu, supra note 4, at 1181–83.
13
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified in scattered
sections of 18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.).
14
Newton & Sidhu, supra note 4, at 1184–85.
15
Id. at 1171–72, 1171 n.27, 1206, 1235–36, 1235 n.482.
16
Id. at 1288.
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offense itself.17 The court could reduce an offense level by two levels if the
defendant accepted responsibility for the crime18 as well as reduce the final
sentence if the defendant gave substantial assistance to the prosecution.19 The
Guidelines also reflected new congressional legislation setting harsher
penalties for drug crimes and violent crimes.20 The Commission’s handiwork
automatically went into effect in the fall of 1987 after Congress declined to
reject it.21 The Sentencing Guidelines initially faced constitutional challenges
based on separation of powers and impermissible delegation, and over 200
district court judges struck it down, but the Supreme Court upheld the
Guidelines.22
Today’s Guidelines largely reflects the Commission’s original work, with
a major exception.23 Despite the Supreme Court’s original determination that
the Guidelines is constitutional, in 2005 the Court struck down the
mandatory nature of the Sentencing Guidelines and held that it is advisory
only.24 In fiscal year 2019, courts sentenced about 51% of offenders within the
recommended range for the particular offense, but courts sentenced another
24% of offenders in conformity with the departures allowed by the
Guidelines, in particular the substantial assistance departure and the Early
Disposition Program.25 Courts must still calculate an offender’s punishment
under the Sentencing Guidelines before departing from that range,26 and the
17

Id. at 1240, 1290–91.
Id. at 1283.
19
Id. at 1285.
20
Newton & Sidhu, supra note 4, at 1273, 1277–79.
21
Id. at 1200.
22
Id. at 1193–94.
23
Id. at 1168 n.7. See generally U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A (U.S. SENT’G
COMM’N 2018) (demonstrating that the modern Sentencing Table remains similar to the
original table).
24
Newton & Sidhu, supra note 4, at 1168 n.7; United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245
(2005).
25
U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION QUARTERLY DATA
REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2019, intro., 11 (2020),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/federal-sentencingstatistics/quarterly-sentencing-updates/USSC-2019_Quarterly_Report_Final.pdf.
26
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A.2 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018) (citing 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)–(5); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264 (2005); Rita v. United
States, 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007)). A probation
officer initially investigates the defendant and prepares a report including the appropriate
sentencing range. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c), (d). But this Comment follows the Sentencing
Guidelines in referring to the work of sentencing as the responsibility of the court without
breaking the process down into those tasks performed by a probation officer and those tasks
18
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Guidelines provides standards to inform trial judges and promote
consistency.27
Under the Guidelines, an offender’s base offense is placed on one of fortythree levels, depending on both the crime charged and factors that
contributed to the severity of the crime,28 such as the use of a weapon29 or the
value of stolen property.30 The range ascends from the least severe crime at
level one to the most severe at level forty-three.31 The court then adjusts this
level based on “victim-related factors, the extent of the offender’s
participation (role in the offense), obstruction, conviction for multiple
offenses, and the offender’s acceptance of responsibility.”32 Finally, the court
considers the offender’s prior criminal history and assigns him points for
recent convictions, with the points translating to a scale of one to six based
on the length or severity of his criminal record.33 The court then uses the
sentencing table to determine where the base offense level, on a vertical axis,
and the offender’s criminal history points, on a horizontal axis, intersect.34
That intersection will outline the range of what the Sentencing Commission
has determined is the appropriate penalty for the offense.35 For ranges in
which the minimum penalty is at least two years of imprisonment, the
maximum imprisonment, in years, is no more than 125% of the minimum
imprisonment, except that the range with a minimum of thirty years has a
maximum of life imprisonment.36 With exceptions for certain crimes, if the
range has a maximum of six months, the court may impose probation instead
of incarceration.37 If the maximum sentence is fifteen months or less, the
court may impose probation with some form of confinement, such as home
detention.38 The Sentencing Guidelines authorizes imposing a sentence
performed by a judge. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N
2018).
27
CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., HOW THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES WORK:
AN OVERVIEW 1 (2015), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R41696/9.
28
Id. at 2, 6.
29
Id. at 6.
30
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(1) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
31
Id. ch. 5, pt. A.
32
DOYLE, supra note 27, at 7.
33
Id. at 19–20; U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.1, ch. 5, pt. A (U.S. SENT’G
COMM’N 2018).
34
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A, cmt. n.1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
35
See id.
36
Id. ch. 5, pt. A; Newton & Sidhu, supra note 4, 1237 n.495.
37
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A, § 5B1.1(a) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
38
Id.
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outside the range if the court finds there is a specific circumstance “not
adequately taken into consideration” by the Guidelines or, upon the
government’s motion, if the offender “provided substantial assistance in the
investigation or prosecution of another person.”39
Finally, the court must “consider the applicable factors in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) taken as a whole.”40 These factors include “the nature and
circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the
defendant,” the purposes of punishment, “the kinds of sentences available,”
the Guidelines, policy concerns, avoidance of disparity, and the need for
restitution, all under the umbrella requirement that the sentence be
“sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to serve the purposes of
punishment.41

39
Id. §§ 5K2.0(a)(2)(A), 5K1.1; see CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., FEDERAL
MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES: THE SAFETY VALVE AND SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE
EXCEPTIONS 9–11 (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41326.pdf.
40
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1(c) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
41
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The subsection states in full:

(a) Factors to be considered in imposing a sentence. The court shall
impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply
with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection. The court,
in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider—
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed—
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the
law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most
effective manner;
(3) the kinds of sentences available;
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for—
(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable
category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines—
(i) issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(1)
of title 28, United States Code, subject to any amendments made to such
guidelines by act of Congress (regardless of whether such amendments
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For example, consider the hypothetical case of Jim Doe, a person
convicted of insider trading. A court sentencing Jim would first examine the
Guidelines and see that insider trading has a base level of eight.42 The offense
also includes instructions for special characteristics:
(1) If the gain resulting from the offense exceeded $6,500,
increase by the number of levels from the table in § 2B1.1
(Theft, Property Destruction, and Fraud) corresponding to
that amount.
(2) If the offense involved an organized scheme to engage in
insider trading and the offense level determined above is less
than level 14, increase to level 14.43
If, in this example, Jim gained $10,000 from his crime, the table in § 2B1.1

have yet to be incorporated by the Sentencing Commission into
amendments issued under section 994(p) of title 28); and
(ii) that, except as provided in section 3742(g), are in effect on the date
the defendant is sentenced; or
(B) in the case of a violation of probation or supervised release, the
applicable guidelines or policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(3) of title 28, United States Code,
taking into account any amendments made to such guidelines or policy
statements by act of Congress (regardless of whether such amendments
have yet to be incorporated by the Sentencing Commission into
amendments issued under section 994(p) of title 28);
(5) any pertinent policy statement—
(A) issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(2)
of title 28, United States Code, subject to any amendments made to such
policy statement by act of Congress (regardless of whether such
amendments have yet to be incorporated by the Sentencing Commission
into amendments issued under section 994(p) of title 28); and
(B) that, except as provided in section 3742(g), is in effect on the date
the defendant is sentenced.[;]
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among
defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar
conduct; and
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.
Id.
42
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 1B1.1(a)(1)–(2), 2B1.4(a) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N
2018); See DOYLE, supra note 27, at 6–7.
43
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.4 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
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would prescribe a two-level increase.44 Assuming that the crime was not part
of an organized scheme, the base level would be ten. The court would then
consider adjustments related to the victim, the offender’s role in the crime,
and whether the offender obstructed justice or committed a related offense.45
Here, if Jim had obstructed justice in connection with the charged offense,
his base level would be increased by two, to twelve.46 Next, the court would
repeat the process for additional counts and potentially group counts
together.47 The court would then consider a reduction for acceptance of
responsibility.48 Here, if Jim committed only a single offense and did not
accept responsibility, the base level would remain at twelve, and the next
consideration would be Jim’s criminal history.49
The Sentencing Guidelines assigns points for prior criminal history based
on the length, recency, and number of prior sentences, as well as whether any
sentences were for certain kinds of conduct, such as drug-related or violent
conduct.50 Sentences for some types of minor offenses are never counted,
while specific rules apply for an offender considered a “career offender” or
an “armed career criminal.”51 Even serious prior crimes are not counted if the
offender’s sentence ended at least fifteen years prior, and the time
requirement is lower for less serious crimes.52 If, in our example, Jim had only
one prior conviction for a non-violent offense committed ten years prior, and
he had been sentenced to five years in prison, he would have three points.53
Those points would then translate to Criminal History Category II, which
includes offenders with two or three points.54
The court would then look to the table to determine where Jim’s base
offense level of twelve and criminal history of two intersect.55 The Sentencing
Guidelines suggests a sentence of twelve to eighteen months imprisonment,
which is in Zone C, meaning Jim would not be eligible for probation.56

44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56

Id. § 2B1.1(b)(1).
Id. § 1B1.1(a)(3), ch. 3; DOYLE, supra note 27, at 7.
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
Id. § 1B1.1(a)(4); DOYLE, supra note 27, at 15–16.
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1(a)(5) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
Id. § 1B1.1(a)(5)–(6).
Id. §§ 4A1.1 cmt. background, 4A1.2(e), 4B1.1(a).
Id. §§ 4A1.2(c), 4B1.1(a), 4B1.4(a); DOYLE, supra note 27, at 20.
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2(e) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
Id. §§ 4A1.1(a), 4A1.2(e).
Id. ch. 5, pt. A; DOYLE, supra note 27, at 18.
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1(a)(7) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
Id. ch. 5, pt. A, § 5B1.1 cmt. n.2.
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However, the court would next look at sentencing options and find that Jim
would be eligible for a sentence that only requires half of the minimum
sentence to be served in prison, with the other half to be served under
supervised release.57 Finally, lest the sentencing be too rigid, the court would
consider special characteristics and grounds for departing from the
sentencing range, “policy statements or commentary in the [G]uidelines,”
and factors from 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including the purposes of punishment:
justice, deterrence, protection of the public, and rehabilitation.58
B.

Obstruction of Justice as a Sentence Adjustment

The Sentencing Guidelines provides for an increase in the offense level if
warranted by certain factors related to the victim, the defendant’s role in the
criminal activity, or the defendant’s obstruction of justice.59 For obstruction
of justice, § 3C1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines instructs courts as follows:
If (1) the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or
attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of
justice with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or
sentencing of the instant offense of conviction, and (2) the
obstructive conduct related to (A) the defendant’s offense of
conviction and any relevant conduct; or (B) a closely related
offense, increase the offense level by 2 levels.60
There has been some confusion about what behavior constitutes obstruction
of justice.61 The commentary to the Guidelines outlines examples of activities
that do and do not constitute obstruction.62 For example, it provides that
lying under oath to police is obstruction only if it “significantly obstructed or

57

Id. §§ 1B1.1(a)(8), 5C1.1(d).
Id. § 1B1.1(b); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
59
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1(a)(3) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018); DOYLE,
supra note 27, at 7.
60
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
61
See, e.g., United States v. Iverson, 874 F.3d 855, 857 (5th Cir. 2017) (holding that lying
about assets to obtain court-appointed counsel is obstruction); United States v.
Khimchiachvili, 372 F.3d 75, 82–83 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that lying about assets to obtain
court-appointed counsel is not obstruction); Peter J. Henning, Balancing the Need for
Enhanced Sentences for Perjury at Trial Under Section 3C1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines and
the Defendant’s Right to Testify, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 933, 934, 959–60 (1992) (presenting the
view that a defendant’s false testimony should be treated as obstruction, but not based on a
jury’s guilty verdict alone).
62
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1 cmt. nn.4–5 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018);
DOYLE, supra note 27, at 13–14.
58
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impeded the official investigation or prosecution of the instant offense.”63
In the example above, Jim would have received a sentence of eight to
fourteen months if he had not received the obstruction of justice
adjustment.64 It is possible his sentence would have been the same regardless
of whether he received the adjustment, because there is overlap between the
applicable ranges. However, the lower sentence would have been in Zone B,
making Jim eligible for probation combined with some type of non-prison
confinement, thereby potentially allowing him to escape prison altogether.65
Thus, the question of what constitutes obstruction of justice can impact an
offender significantly.
III. DOES LYING TO OBTAIN COURT-APPOINTED COUNSEL CONSTITUTE
OBSTRUCTION?
The commentary to the Sentencing Guidelines provides eleven examples
of conduct that constitutes obstruction of justice, including “providing
materially false information to a judge or magistrate judge” and “providing a
materially false statement to a law enforcement officer that significantly
obstructed or impeded the official investigation or prosecution of the instant
offense.”66 Federal circuit courts are divided on the question of whether lying
about assets to obtain court-appointed counsel constitutes obstruction for
purposes of the sentence adjustment.67 Most of the circuits that have
considered this question determined that it constitutes obstruction.68 The
Second Circuit, however, determined that lying about assets is not necessarily
obstruction.69 Thus, in cases where a defendant lied about her assets to obtain
court-appointed counsel, a sentence calculated in the Second Circuit could
differ significantly from a sentence calculated elsewhere.
63

U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1 cmt. nn.4–5 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018);
DOYLE, supra note 27, at 13–14.
64
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
65
Id. § 5B1.1(a), ch. 5, pt. A.
66
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
67
Circuit Splits, 14 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 292 (2018); see United States v. Iverson, 874
F.3d 855, 857 (5th Cir. 2017) (holding that lying about assets to obtain court-appointed
counsel is obstruction); United States v. Khimchiachvili, 372 F.3d 75, 83 (2d Cir. 2004)
(holding that lying about assets to obtain court-appointed counsel is not obstruction).
68
Iverson, 874 F.3d at 857; United States v. Hernandez-Ramirez, 254 F.3d 841, 842 (9th
Cir. 2001); United States v. Ruff, 79 F.3d 123, 126 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam); United
States v. Westmoreland, 72 F. App’x 29, 31 (4th Cir. 2003) (per curiam). See also United
States v. Jallad, 468 F. App’x 600, 607–08 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that there was no plain
error where the court imposed the adjustment for lying on a financial affidavit and also
affirming the sentence based on “the doctrine of invited error”).
69
Khimchiachvili, 372 F.3d at 82–83.
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The Inclusive Approach: Lying About Assets Is Obstruction

The Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have considered the
question and have determined that lying about assets to obtain courtappointed counsel is obstruction.70 These courts have dealt with slightly
different challenges to the adjustment’s application.71 Each court, however,
focused special attention on the commentary to § 3C1.1, which states that
“providing materially false information to a judge or magistrate judge” is an
example of obstruction.72
1.

United States v. Ruff

In United States v. Ruff, the Eleventh Circuit considered the appeal of John
Ruff, who had been charged with four drug and weapons violations.73 Prior
to trial, Ruff appeared before a magistrate seeking court-appointed counsel.74
Ruff was under oath during the hearing.75 The magistrate asked Ruff whether
he had any checking accounts, savings accounts, or safe deposit boxes.76 Ruff
replied that he did not.77 The magistrate determined that Ruff could not
afford an attorney and appointed one to represent him.78 However, Ruff
70

Iverson, 874 F.3d at 857; Hernandez-Ramirez, 254 F.3d at 842; Ruff, 79 F.3d at 126;
Westmoreland, 72 F. App’x at 31.
71
Iverson, 874 F.3d at 858 (discussing the defendant’s argument that such lies do not
interfere with justice and that he lacked the required intent); Hernandez-Ramirez, 254 F.3d at
843 (discussing the defendant’s “conten[tion] that his conduct was not willful or material”);
Ruff, 79 F.3d at 125 (discussing the defendant’s argument that his lie was not material);
Westmoreland, 72 F. App’x at 31 (discussing the defendant’s argument that his lie was not
material).
72
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018); Iverson,
874 F.3d at 858; Hernandez-Ramirez, 254 F.3d at 843; Ruff, 79 F.3d at 124; Westmoreland, 72
F. App’x at 31. Like the court in Ruff, the court in Westmoreland also focused on materiality,
stating:
The issue under determination here was whether Westmoreland had
enough money to retain an attorney. We conclude that the district court
did not err in finding that Westmoreland's failure to list $22,500 in cash
“would tend to influence or affect” whether Westmoreland was entitled to
court-appointed counsel, particularly when this amount of money is
viewed in relationship to $46,200, which Westmoreland listed as his
estimated net worth.
Id.
73
Ruff, 79 F.3d at 124.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id. at 124 & n.1.
77
Id.
78
Id. at 124.
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obtained his own counsel within four days of the hearing.79
Meanwhile, an investigator took a key found on Ruff’s person prior to the
hearing, along with keys found on Ruff’s father, and matched them to three
safe deposit boxes that were registered to Ruff and his father.80 The boxes
contained a total of $37,675 and two and a half grams of crack cocaine.81 Bank
records showed that Ruff had visited each box and was the last to visit two of
the boxes.82
Ruff eventually pleaded guilty to two of the charges, and the prosecution
dropped the two remaining charges.83 However, at sentencing the court
determined that Ruff obstructed justice when he lied about having safe
deposit boxes.84 Consequently, the court applied the two-level sentence
adjustment.85
Ruff appealed to the Eleventh Circuit, arguing that his lie was not
material.86 He pointed out that he obtained his own attorney and
consequently was never represented by the court-appointed attorney.87 Ruff
also argued that his lie did not negatively affect the investigation, as the
investigator found the safe deposit boxes anyway.88 Furthermore, Ruff
contended that the misrepresentation did not occur at trial or at any
important pre-trial hearing.89
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed with Ruff.90 The court particularly focused
its analysis on materiality.91 The court noted that, under the examples from
the Sentencing Guidelines, a lie to an investigator must significantly obstruct
or impede the investigation to constitute obstruction, but a lie to the court
has no such limitation.92 Materiality is the only limit on when a lie to the court
is obstruction.93 Thus, it was irrelevant that Ruff’s lie did not prevent the

79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93

Ruff, 79 F.3d at 124.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 125.
Ruff, 79 F.3d at 125.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Ruff, 79 F.3d at 125–26.
Id. at 125.
Id.
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investigator from discovering the safe deposit boxes.94
The court also rejected Ruff’s argument that his lie was not material
because he obtained his own attorney.95 In the court’s view, whether
something is material depends on the question the court is answering in the
particular proceeding.96 The commentary to § 3C1.1 of the Sentencing
Guidelines states that “‘[m]aterial’ evidence, fact, statement, or information,
as used in this section, means evidence, fact, statement, or information that,
if believed, would tend to influence or affect the issue under determination.”97
The Eleventh Circuit followed this reasoning to hold that a fact is deemed
material if it is material to a particular issue under consideration.98
Materiality is judged relative to a particular issue, rather than relative to
determining guilt or innocence.99
In determining whether Ruff had obstructed justice, the court focused
more on the examples in the commentary than on the text of the guideline.100
The court did not seem particularly concerned with whether Ruff’s lie
obstructed or impeded “the administration of justice,”101 though it held that
the obstruction was sufficiently related to the underlying crime, noting that
“[t]he subject matter of the hearing, Ruff’s legal representation, involved the
potential prosecution of the crime. This is sufficient to meet the requirements
of the guideline.”102Thus, the court affirmed Ruff’s two-level adjustment.103
2.

United States v. Hernandez-Ramirez

The Ninth Circuit considered the same issue in United States v.
Hernandez-Ramirez, a case in which a tax preparer was charged, ironically,
with “corruptly impeding and obstructing the administration of tax laws,”
passing forged checks, and “willfully assisting the preparation of false tax
94

Id. at 125–26.
Id.
96
Id. at 126.
97
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1 cmt. n.6 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018). In
formulating this definition, the Sentencing Commission may have had in mind the Federal
Rules of Evidence, which state that a fact is material if it “is of consequence in determining
the action.” FED. R. EVID. 401(b) & advisory committee’s notes.
98
Ruff, 79 F.3d at 125–26.
99
See id.
100
Id. at 125.
101
United States v. Khimchiachvili, 372 F.3d 75, 82 (2d Cir. 2004) (“We believe the
Eleventh Circuit was wrong to read [sic] define ‘material’ without reference to the
requirement that the conduct be designed to obstruct or impede the administration of
justice.”).
102
Ruff, 79 F.3d at 125.
103
Id. at 126.
95
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returns.”104 Juan Hernandez-Ramirez told a probation officer about a bar he
co-owned, but when he filled out an affidavit to determine eligibility for
court-appointed counsel, he only listed the $35,000 debt he owed for the
business, not the value of the business.105 Hernandez later claimed that he did
not think he was still the owner because he was behind on the payments and
the business was not in his name.106 Nevertheless, the court did not find his
story credible and imposed the adjustment for obstruction of justice.107
On appeal, Hernandez argued that “his conduct was not willful or
material.”108 The guideline itself requires willfulness, while the commentary’s
example specifically mentions materiality in connection with lying to a
court.109 Thus, willfulness is always required, but materiality is only necessary
in certain instances, including when the court relies on the commentary’s
examples to base an obstruction adjustment on a lie told to the court.110
Hernandez said that he had not intentionally misled the court and that his
statement was immaterial because even if he had reported the ownership
interest in the affidavit he still would have qualified for court-appointed
counsel.111
The Ninth Circuit held that the district court’s finding of willfulness was
not clearly erroneous because Hernandez was a “tax preparer, familiar with
the concept of assets and liabilities.”112 The court stated:
If, as Hernandez contends, he did not believe that he owned
the bar because he was not its nominal owner, or because he
was unable to make payments on the note and assumed he
would lose his interest, then he would have no debt. Either
way, the affidavit was willfully false.113
The court did not consider the possibility that Hernandez no longer had an
interest in the business but still had the debt. If Hernandez signed over his
interest in the business it would not necessarily—indeed, would not likely—
104

United States v. Hernandez-Ramirez, 254 F.3d 841, 842 (9th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 842–43.
106
Id. at 843.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1 & cmt. n.4 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
110
Id. § 3C1.1 cmt. nn.4–5. Because the list of examples in the commentary is “nonexhaustive,” technically a non-material lie to the court could still constitute obstruction in
some instances. Id.
111
Hernandez-Ramirez, 254 F.3d at 843.
112
Id.
113
Id.
105
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have freed him from personal liability for the debt.
The court likewise made short work of Hernandez’s materiality
argument.114 The court noted that, unlike misrepresentations to law
enforcement officers, “false representations to probation officers are material
whether or not they result in an actual obstruction.”115 Like the court in Ruff,
the Ninth Circuit applied the definition of materiality from the commentary
and determined that Hernandez’s statement was material because it “‘would
tend to influence or affect’ whether the magistrate judge found him qualified
for appointed counsel”—even if the final determination was the same.116
Hernandez also raised the issue of relatedness.117 The guideline requires
that “the obstructive conduct relate[] to (A) the defendant’s offense of
conviction and any relevant conduct; or (B) a closely related offense.”118 The
Sentencing Commission added that language as part of its 1998 amendments
to the Guidelines.119 However, the Ninth Circuit held that applying the
adjustment to Hernandez did not violate the amended guideline, pointing to
its decision in United States v. Verdin three months earlier,120 where it had
explained that this language was added in 1998 to expand the conduct
covered by the guideline, not restrict it.121 In amending the provision, the
Sentencing Commission stated its intent to resolve a circuit split in favor of
the majority view, which allowed the adjustment to apply in more cases.122
Thus, in Hernandez-Ramirez, the Ninth Circuit determined that the
obstruction need not “relate substantively” to the offense of conviction.123
The lie related to the prosecution of the offense, and that was a sufficient
relationship to meet the guideline’s requirement.124 Once again, the court did
not consider whether Hernandez’s misrepresentation met the baseline

114

See id. at 843–44.
Id. at 844.
116
Id.
117
Hernandez-Ramirez, 254 F.3d at 844.
118
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018); HernandezRamirez, 254 F.3d at 844.
119
Hernandez-Ramirez, 254 F.3d at 843; U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, AMENDMENTS TO THE
SENTENCING GUIDELINES 23 (1998).
120
Hernandez-Ramirez, 254 F.3d at 844.
121
United States v. Verdin, 243 F.3d 1174, 1180 (9th Cir. 2001).
122
U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, AMENDMENTS TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES 23 (1998);
Hernandez-Ramirez, 254 F.3d at 844;
Verdin, 243 F.3d at 1180.
123
Hernandez-Ramirez, 254 F.3d at 844.
124
Id.
115
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requirement of obstructing or impeding “the administration of justice,”125 or
whether Hernandez had attempted to do so, relying on the commentary’s
examples as conclusive.126
3.

United States v. Iverson

In 2017, the Fifth Circuit affirmed two previous unpublished opinions and
held that lying about assets constitutes obstruction.127 Michael Iverson was
convicted of a brutal 1995 kidnapping and rape and thereafter was required
to register as a sex offender.128 He did not do so when he moved to Texas and
was charged with failure to register.129 When listing his assets for a
determination of indigency, he stated that he owned three vehicles whose
total worth was $5,500.130 However, the presentence report valued the
vehicles at $18,500.131 Iverson admitted to intentionally lying to obtain courtappointed counsel, but he then argued that he had been confused about
whether the vehicles should be valued as-is or as though they were in good
condition.132 The trial court applied the obstruction of justice adjustment and
sentenced Iverson to thirty-seven months imprisonment and five years of
supervised release.133
Iverson appealed, arguing that he did not intentionally mislead the court
and that his misrepresentation did “not interfere with the investigation or
prosecution of the offense.”134 Because Iverson had confessed to intentionally
lying, the court of appeals would not disturb the district court’s factual
finding that Iverson intended to mislead the court.135 The court responded to
Iverson’s other argument by looking at both the Guidelines and the precedent
from sister circuits.136
The court began its analysis with the text of the guideline,137 focusing more
attention on the administration of justice than had the courts in Ruff and
125

U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
United States v. Khimchiachvili, 372 F.3d 75, 81–82 (2d Cir. 2004); HernandezRamirez, 254 F.3d at 843–44.
127
United States v. Iverson, 874 F.3d 855, 858, 860 (5th Cir. 2017).
128
Id. at 857, 861.
129
Id. at 857.
130
Id. at 858.
131
Id.
132
Id. at 860.
133
Iverson, 874 F.3d at 857–58.
134
Id. at 858.
135
Id. at 860.
136
Id. at 858–60.
137
Id. at 858.
126
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Hernandez-Ramirez.138 Still, the court easily identified the defendant’s
conduct with the text of the guideline, stating:
On its face, that language appears to include lying to a court
to obtain free counsel. Procuring the financial resources of a
court under false pretenses interferes with the proper
administration of the criminal justice system. And that
obstruction is with respect to, and relates to—that is, it
occurred in connection with—the prosecution of Iverson’s
failure-to-report offense.139
After determining that the text applied, the court moved on to the
commentary’s examples, deciding that “producing a ‘false, altered, or
counterfeit document or record during an official investigation or judicial
proceeding’ and ‘providing materially false information to a judge or
magistrate judge’” both applied to Iverson’s conduct.140
The court then turned to precedent.141 The court noted that it had twice
considered the issue and decided that lying about assets constitutes
obstruction, a decision in accord with Ruff and Hernandez-Ramirez.142
However, the court also discussed the Second Circuit’s conflicting opinion in
United States v. Khimchiachvili.143 The court in Iverson addressed this split by
stating that “[t]he disagreement among these circuits is over whether the
defendant’s false statements must have been intended to undermine the
investigation or prosecution of the offense.”144 In siding with the circuits that
answered in the negative, the court looked once again at the distinction
138
Compare id., with United States v. Ruff, 79 F.3d 123, 125–26 (11th Cir. 1996) (per
curiam) (identifying the defendant’s conduct with the example in the commentary), and
United States v. Hernandez-Ramirez, 254 F.3d 841, 843–44 (9th Cir. 2001) (focusing on
willfulness and Part B of the guideline, along with the commentary’s example).
139
Iverson, 874 F.3d at 858.
140
Id. (quoting U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1 cmt. nn.4(C), 4(F) (U.S. SENT’G
COMM’N 2018)).
141
Id.
142
Id.; see United States v. Sanchez, 227 F. App’x 412, 413 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam)
(“False statements on a financial affidavit can serve as the basis for the obstruction
adjustment.”); United States v. Resendez, No. 98-40196, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 40361, at *1
(5th Cir. June 16, 1999) (per curiam) (holding that producing “a fraudulent financial
affidavit” is grounds for the obstruction adjustment). Both prior opinions were unpublished,
and neither contained more than a brief analysis of whether false statements about assets
made to obtain court-appointed counsel warrant an adjustment for obstruction. Sanchez,
227 F. App’x at 413 & n.*; Resendez, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 40361, at *1 & n.*.
143
Iverson, 874 F.3d at 859; see infra Section III.B.
144
Iverson, 874 F.3d at 859.
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between lying to the court and lying to law enforcement officers, a distinction
reflected in the commentary.145 The Fifth Circuit noted that “attempts to
improperly influence judicial proceedings more directly interfere with the
administration of justice than does similar conduct occurring in non-judicial
contexts.”146 The court went on to say that the Second Circuit “may have
overlooked a distinction between” the two types of lies.147
The Fifth Circuit also countered the Second Circuit’s comparison between
lying to the court about assets and lying to a probation officer about drug
use—a type of conduct specifically excluded from the obstruction adjustment
after a 1998 amendment to the commentary.148 The court reasoned that lying
about assets impacts the entire criminal proceeding and could even cause a
delay if the misrepresentation were discovered prior to trial and a new
attorney had to take over.149 Thus, the Fifth Circuit held that lying about
assets is obstruction of justice, joining the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits.150
B.

The Second Circuit Approach: United States v. Khimchiachvili

In United States v. Khimchiachvili, the Second Circuit considered the case
of George Englert, who had pleaded “guilty to mortgage fraud, wire fraud,
and conspiracy to commit wire fraud” after being investigated for “an
elaborate scheme” to defraud.151 Englert had obtained court-appointed
counsel.152 After he pleaded guilty, Englert reported to the probation office
that he had liabilities of $345,000 but assets of $817,000, including “paintings,
furniture, and antiques worth $300,000.”153 His initial statement of financial
145

Id.
Id.
147
Id.
148
Id. at 859–60; U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, AMENDMENTS TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES 25
(1998).
149
Iverson, 874 F.3d at 860.
150
Id.
151
United States v. Khimchiachvili, 372 F.3d 75, 76 (2d Cir. 2004). Englert, Robert
Khimchiachvili, Cesar Viana, Christopher Berwick, and Brian Sherry were codefendants in
the criminal proceedings. Id. at 75. Englert’s appeal of his sentence adjustment was separated
from Berwick and Viana’s appeal of their convictions. United States v. Sherry, 107 F. App’x
253, 255 (2d Cir. 2004), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Berwick v. United States, 544 U.S.
917 (2005). Englert’s codefendants’ appeal was unsuccessful before the Second Circuit, but
the Supreme Court vacated the judgment upon the appeal of Berwick. Sherry, 107 F. App’x at
259; Berwick, 544 U.S. at 917. Numerous aliases were listed in the caption naming the
defendants; Englert’s aliases were Dr. Moncrieffe, Baron Moncrieffe, and Prince George.
Khimchiachvili, 372 F.3d at 75.
152
Khimchiachvili, 372 F.3d at 76.
153
Id. at 77.
146
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worth for purposes of obtaining court-appointed counsel could not be found,
but the trial court determined that Englert must have lied to obtain counsel,
and it imposed the two-level adjustment for obstruction.154 Because the court
applied the adjustment, Englert did not receive the three-level reduction for
acceptance of responsibility recommended in the probation report—a
reduction the prosecution initially did not oppose.155 He was sentenced to
forty-one months imprisonment and five years of supervised release, in
addition to restitution and a special assessment.156
Englert appealed his sentence, arguing that the adjustment should not
have been imposed when the financial affidavit had not been produced “and
there was no clear showing” of intent to obstruct.157 He also argued that he
should have received a reduction for accepting responsibility.158 In hearing
Englert’s appeal, the Second Circuit considered only the issue of “whether
swearing to a false financial affidavit in order to obtain court-appointed
counsel constitutes obstruction of justice.”159 The court agreed with Englert
that his conduct did not constitute obstruction and overturned his
sentence.160 Ironically, Englert’s misrepresentation was more dramatic than
anything perpetrated in Ruff, Hernandez-Ramirez, or Iverson, but Englert
was the one who successfully defeated his adjustment for obstruction of
justice.
In reaching its decision, the court focused on the Sentencing Guidelines’s
requirement of willfulness and determined that Englert did not demonstrate
the necessary intent to obstruct.161 In determining what constitutes willful
obstruction of the administration of justice, the court looked not so much at
the commentary’s examples, as other courts did, but rather at the
amendments over time.162 First, the Second Circuit noted that in United
States v. Stroud it had held that fleeing from law enforcement did not
constitute obstruction because the fleeing suspect’s primary intent was to
“avoid apprehension,” not to “frustrate or impede” an investigation.163 The
Sentencing Commission thereafter amended its Guidelines to agree with the
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 77.
Khimchiachvili, 372 F.3d at 77.
Id. at 78.
Id. at 82–83.
Id. at 80.
Id. at 78–80.
Id. at 78 (quoting United States v. Stroud, 893 F.2d 504, 508 (2d Cir. 1990)).
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Stroud holding,164 and “avoiding or fleeing from arrest” is now listed in the
examples as conduct that does not ordinarily constitute obstruction.165
The court next pointed to its earlier decision in United States v. ThomasHamilton that a “defendant’s threats to a drug treatment counselor” did not
constitute obstruction because there was “no indication whatsoever that [the
defendant’s] alleged threat was made with the purpose of obstructing
justice.”166 The court noted that the Third Circuit similarly focused on
purpose in holding that a defendant did not obstruct justice by attempting to
quitclaim an interest in real estate so that the government would not obtain
the interest.167 The Third Circuit had simultaneously decided that lying to a
probation officer about drug use was also not obstruction, notwithstanding
the fact that “[t]he commentary to § 3C1.1 stated without qualification that,
‘providing materially false information to a probation officer in respect to a
presentence or other investigation for the court’ was an example of
obstruction of justice.”168 The Third Circuit’s view was vindicated when the
Sentencing Commission amended the commentary to clarify that “lying to a
probation officer about drug use while released on bail” is not obstruction of
justice.169 The Second Circuit explained:
By amending the Application Notes of § 3C1.1 . . . the
Sentencing Commission twice reaffirmed a common sense
definition of what constitutes obstruction of justice—
conduct that willfully interferes with or attempts to interfere
with the disposition of the criminal charges against a
defendant. An enhancement for obstruction of justice is
therefore only warranted “if the court finds that the
defendant willfully and materially impeded the search for
justice in the instant offense.” Or, as we have written, the
“conclusion that ‘obstruct,’ in this context, relates to
anything that can make it more difficult to carry out a just
result in a criminal case [is] erroneous as a matter of law.”
For a defendant’s conduct to qualify as obstruction of justice,
164

Khimchiachvili, 372 F.3d at 78.
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1 cmt. n.5 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
166
Khimchiachvili, 372 F.3d at 78–79 (quoting United States v. Thomas-Hamilton, 907
F.2d 282, 286 (2d Cir. 1990)).
167
Id. at 79 (citing United States v. Belletiere, 971 F.2d 961, 965 (3d Cir. 1992)).
168
Id. (quoting U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4(h) (U.S. SENT’G
COMM’N 2018)) (discussing Belletiere, 971 F.2d at 965).
169
Id. at 79–80 (quoting U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, AMENDMENTS TO THE SENTENCING
GUIDELINES 25 (1998)).
165
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it must have the “potential to impede” the investigation,
prosecution, or sentencing of the defendant. It cannot
simply be a misrepresentation.170
Thus, the court considered intent to obstruct to be something more than
intent to deceive the trial court.171 The intent to obstruct was lacking in
Englert’s situation because Englert “was not seeking to prevent justice or even
delay it”; rather, he was simply trying to avoid paying for his own lawyer.172
Englert would have been represented by a lawyer regardless of whether he
was truthful, and the identity of the fee-payer was inconsequential to the
eventual verdict and sentencing.173
The court also rejected the argument the Eleventh Circuit found
persuasive in Ruff, that a comparison of examples in the commentary
to § 3C1.1 shows that materiality is the only requirement for a lie to the court
to constitute obstruction.174 The commentary lists as examples of obstruction
both “providing materially false information to a judge or magistrate” and
“providing a materially false statement to a law enforcement officer that
significantly obstructed or impeded the official investigation or prosecution
of the instant offense.”175 The Second Circuit, however, reasoned that this
difference in language is intended to place an added limitation on when lies
to a law enforcement officer constitute obstruction, not to imply that lies to
the court are always obstruction.176 In the Second Circuit’s view, acting with
“the purpose of obstructing justice” is still a necessary element of obstruction
even if the defendant has told a material lie to the court.177 The court pointed
to yet another example of obstruction in the Sentencing Guidelines—
“providing materially false information to a probation officer in respect to a
presentence or other investigation for the court.”178 This language mirrors
that of the other two examples but is definitely not intended to mean that
providing such information is always obstruction, as demonstrated by the
170

Id. at 80 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (first quoting United States v. Zagari,
111 F.3d 307, 328 (2d Cir. 1997); then quoting United States v. Stroud, 893 F.2d 504, 507 (2d
Cir. 1990); and then quoting United States v. McKay, 183 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 1999)).
171
Id.
172
Khimchiachvili, 372 F.3d at 80.
173
Id.
174
Id. at 80–81; see United States v. Ruff, 79 F.3d 123, 125–26 (11th Cir. 1996) (per
curiam).
175
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
176
Khimchiachvili, 372 F.3d at 81.
177
Id.
178
Id. (quoting U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N
2018)).

2022]

LYING TO GET A COURT APPOINTED ATTORNEY

253

amendment clarifying that lying about drug use is not obstruction.179
Finally, the Second Circuit considered the precedent of Ruff and
Hernandez-Ramirez but was unconvinced.180 The court noted that the
Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Ruff did not give adequate weight to intent.181
In the court’s view, the Eleventh Circuit erred in “defin[ing] ‘material’
without reference to the requirement that the conduct be designed to
obstruct or impede the administration of justice.”182 The false statement’s
“effect or its intention must be to somehow ‘impede[] the search for
justice.’”183 Englert’s statement had neither that intention nor that effect.184
The Second Circuit also considered Hernandez-Ramirez but reasoned that
the Ninth Circuit “never squarely addressed the issue” of intent to obstruct.185
Instead, the Ninth Circuit rejected the defendant’s argument that the second
clause of § 3C1.1 requires a substantive relation between the obstruction and
the crime of conviction.186 But the Second Circuit suggested the key to
determining whether conduct is obstruction lies in the first clause.187 The
court said that it was “focus[ed] on the language of clause (A) that the Ninth
Circuit passed over, and particularly the requirement that the defendant
‘willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the
administration of justice.’”188 The Second Circuit suggested that Englert’s
conduct could perhaps be punishable another way, through a different
adjustment or an upward departure, but it was adamant that Englert had
neither intended to obstruct justice nor actually obstructed justice, and the
adjustment under § 3C1.1 was inapplicable.189
C.

Questions to Consider

A comparison of the reasoning in Ruff, Hernandez-Ramirez, Iverson, and
Khimchiachvili raises a few questions. First, do the examples in the
commentary to § 3C1.1 represent conduct that always, or nearly always,
constitutes obstruction of justice? The courts in Ruff and Hernandez-Ramirez

179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189

Id.; see U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1 cmt. n.5 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
Khimchiachvili, 372 F.3d at 81.
Id. at 82.
Id.
Id. (quoting United States v. Zagari, 111 F.3d 307, 328 (2d Cir. 1997)).
Id.
Id. at 81.
Khimchiachvili, 372 F.3d at 82.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 82–83.
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treated the examples as conclusive.190 The court in Khimchiachvili, however,
pointed out that at least one example—materially lying to a probation
officer—does not always constitute obstruction, as evidenced by the specific
carve-out for lying about drug use.191 Thus, it seems that the examples in the
commentary should not be considered conclusive.192 The examples represent
types of obstruction, but the definition of obstruction must be found
elsewhere.
Another question arises as to the intent required for obstruction of justice.
As noted above, some courts focus more on materiality than intent.193 Even
the Second Circuit painted a less-than-clear image of the standard for
determining intent.194 Must the defendant always act with the purpose of
obstructing justice? Or does the adjustment apply to intentional conduct that
has the effect of obstructing justice?
Finally, what is obstruction of the administration of justice? Is obstruction
of the administration of justice the same as obstruction of the justice system?
190

See supra Sections III.A.1, III.A.2.
Khimchiachvili, 372 F.3d at 81; see U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1 cmt. n.5
(U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
192
Khimchiachvili, 372 F.3d at 81 (“There is no indication, however, that the Sentencing
Commission intended to provide that a false statement to a judge or magistrate not made for
the purpose of obstructing justice should warrant an enhancement.”). The Supreme Court
has said that “commentary in the Guidelines Manual that interprets or explains a guideline is
authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or
a plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline.” Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38
(1993). But this statement would only control the outcome here if the commentary itself
treated the examples as conclusive interpretations. It is unclear that this is the case. The
commentary does note that the examples of obstruction of justice make up “a nonexhaustive list of examples of the types of conduct to which this adjustment applies”—not to
which it might apply. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4 (U.S. SENT’G
COMM’N 2018). But the commentary also states that “[a]lthough the conduct to which this
adjustment applies is not subject to precise definition, comparison of the examples set forth
in Application Notes 4 and 5 should assist the court in determining whether application of
this adjustment is warranted in a particular case.” Id. at § 3C1.1 cmt. n.3. And importantly,
the commentary uses the word “examples.” Id. Thus, in light of the contradiction regarding
lying about drug use that the Khimchiachvili court pointed out, it appears that the examples
are not conclusive statements that particular conduct is always obstruction of justice. See
Khimchiachvili, 372 F.3d at 81.
193
See supra Sections III.A.1, III.A.2, III.B.
194
See supra Section III.B. See generally Khimchiachvili, 372 F.3d at 82 (“We believe the
Eleventh Circuit was wrong to read define [sic] ‘material’ without reference to the
requirement that the conduct be designed to obstruct or impede the administration of justice.
It is not enough to simply say that the false statements were material because they had an
effect on some discrete action taken by a magistrate judge; that effect or its intention must be
to somehow ‘impede[] the search for justice.’” (emphasis added) (quoting United States v.
Zagari, 111 F.3d 307, 328 (2d Cir. 1997))).
191
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Does administration of justice include every minute detail of the criminal
justice system, or should the prohibition on obstruction be read instead as a
ban on conduct that interferes with the criminal receiving her just deserts?
Does the language protect the justice system, or the overall concept of justice?
The court in Khimchiachvili adopted a view of administration of justice
that would exclude obtaining court-appointed counsel and include only the
ultimate conclusion of the case.195 On one hand, if administration of justice
refers to “justice,” rather than “the justice system,” then it would make little
sense to consider lying about assets obstruction. If wrongfully avoiding
paying for an attorney is obstruction, then paying for the attorney would have
to be considered part of justice itself, effectively a punishment before a
verdict. If the essence of § 3C1.1 is to protect the concept of justice, rather
than the justice system, lying about assets is almost automatically excluded
from a definition of obstruction.
The problem with this view of the sentence adjustment is that it does not
neatly align with other applications of the adjustment. Some courts have held
that lies told prior to trial, such as lies told to avoid bond revocation, can
constitute obstruction.196 In some cases, defendants lie to avoid punishment,
in the form of bond revocation, for criminal conduct.197 These cases fit, at
least somewhat, into the “concept of justice” interpretation. Even though the
defendant in a revocation hearing has not been convicted of the underlying
conduct by a jury, the defendant is still being penalized for a wrongful action,
and her lie to avoid that penalty could constitute interference with the
workings of justice.
It is more difficult to square the “concept of justice” interpretation with
those cases in which the defendant told a lie merely to obtain bail, instead of
to avoid punishment. Even the Second Circuit has held that lying to obtain
pre-trial release constitutes obstruction of justice, stating that “a defendant’s
195

See Khimchiachvili, 372 F.3d at 80 (“[Mr. Englert]was not seeking to prevent justice or
even delay it.”).
196
See United States v. Taylor, 749 F.3d 842, 848–49 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that lying to
avoid bond revocation can constitute obstruction); United States v. Jones, 308 F.3d 425, 426,
429 (4th Cir. 2002) (same); United States v. Blackman, 904 F.2d 1250, 1259 (8th Cir. 1990)
(holding that giving law enforcement false identification can constitute obstruction). The
commentary to § 3C1.1 now lists “providing a false name or identification document at
arrest, except where such conduct actually resulted in a significant hindrance to the
investigation or prosecution of the instant offense” as an example of conduct not considered
obstruction. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1 cmt. n.5 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
The statement was added as part of the 1990 amendments. Amendment 347, U.S. SENT’G
COMM’N (Nov. 1, 1990), https://www.ussc.gov/guidelines/amendment/347.
197
Taylor, 749 F.3d at 844–45 (domestic assault); Jones, 308 F.3d at 427 (4th Cir. 2002)
(shooting at someone).
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falsely obtaining bail always has the potential to impede the prosecution of
the offense charged due to the inherent risk that a defendant on bail may not
appear in court as scheduled.”198 Bail may be denied based on previous
criminal conduct, which could place denial in the category of a punishment,
albeit a second punishment for past crimes. But bail may also be denied
because a defendant poses a flight risk. Thus, denial of bail is not always a
punishment.199 Because denying bail does not always constitute punishment,
lying to get bail does not always constitute avoiding justice—if justice is
thought of as getting one’s just deserts.
On the other hand, interpreting “administration of justice” as
“administration of the justice system” creates additional problems. The Fifth
Circuit pointed out in Iverson that lying about assets could delay judicial
proceedings and cited that possibility as evidence that such deceit is
obstruction even though lying about drug use is not.200 It is difficult to
differentiate, though, between conduct that interferes with the smooth
working of the justice system, such as lying about assets, and conduct
specifically excluded from the adjustment in the examples, such as “avoiding
or fleeing from arrest.”201 Judge Heaney, in his dissent in United States v.
Blackman, criticized a broad interpretation of the guideline that equated
giving law enforcement a false identification with more serious forms of
obstruction, particularly because the “real time” increase of a two-level
adjustment depends on the base level of the underlying crime.202 This means
that a defendant could end up serving more time for providing false
identification than another defendant would serve for conduct that actually
obstructed the prosecution:203
Although such disparities are to some extent inevitable
198

United States v. Gumbs, 286 F. App’x 763, 765 (2d Cir. 2008); see also United States v.
Charles, 138 F.3d 257, 267 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that lying about identity to obtain bail is
obstruction).
199
Of course, when a defendant lies to obtain bail, there is likely some underlying
wrongful conduct that the defendant wishes to conceal and that could form the basis for the
“punishment” of denying bail. In Gumbs, the defendant lied about his birthplace and
citizenship to obtain bail because he was in the United States illegally. 286 F. App’x at 764–
65. The lie thus concealed criminal conduct. In Charles, the defendant presented false
identification to the magistrate, “thereby conceal[ing] his prior criminal record,” so that the
magistrate would allow him to post bail. 138 F.3d at 266–67.
200
See supra Section III.A.3.
201
See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1 cmt. n.5 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
202
United States v. Blackman, 904 F.2d 1250, 1261 (8th Cir. 1990) (Heaney, J.,
dissenting).
203
Id.
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under the [G]uidelines, extending section 3C1.1 to conduct
as innocuous as Blackman’s futile attempt to avoid
apprehension increases the risk that the obstruction
adjustment will be used to punish widely varying levels of
evasive conduct with sentences of undifferentiated severity.
Moreover, by applying section 3C1.1 to conduct engaged in
during the commission of a crime to avoid apprehension, the
majority creates the possibility that any affirmative step
taken by a defendant to avoid detection could qualify for a
two-level increase for obstruction of justice. Thus, conduct
such as concealing one’s identity from one’s victim during
the commission of a crime or fleeing the scene of the crime
arguably could merit the same two-level adjustment as
committing perjury or threatening a witness, because all
such acts ultimately are “calculated to mislead or deceive
authorities.”204
Judge Heaney’s concern about where to draw the line applies to the broader
question of what constitutes obstruction of justice generally, including when
the conduct is charged as a separate crime. In fact, clearing one’s browser
history could be considered the independent crime of obstruction of justice,
even when there is no nexus between the action and an official
investigation.205 When a defendant is charged with the separate crime of
obstruction of justice, there are at least two safeguards—an elected legislature
that defined the crime and a jury that will determine guilt. But when a
defendant is not charged with a separate crime and is instead punished with
a sentence adjustment, there is no legislative definition and no jury. This
difference makes it imperative that courts accurately draw the line between
actual obstruction and conduct that is merely blameworthy without being
obstructive.
IV. PROPOSAL
“Obstruction of justice” is defined as “[i]nterference with the orderly
administration of law and justice, as by giving false information to or
withholding evidence from a police officer or prosecutor, or by harming or
intimidating a witness or juror.”206 Notwithstanding this broad definition, in
popular culture obstruction of justice may be thought of as a political
204

Id. at 1261–62 (citations omitted) (quoting U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1
cmt. (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 1989)).
205
DeVries, supra note 1, at 14, 20–22.
206
Obstruction of Justice, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
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crime,207 a white-collar crime, or an organized crime activity. The crime may
be associated with television images of potential defendants shredding
documents in the last minutes before police raid an office or witnesses
refusing to testify because they have been threatened by a well-connected
defendant. Presidential scandals encourage an understanding of obstruction
as a crime related to power.208 In reality, though, the sentence adjustment
under § 3C1.1 is often applied to ordinary defendants who simply commit
perjury at trial.209 Nevertheless, there may be good reason for a narrower
understanding of obstruction, with deeper roots than either television
programming or modern political scandals.
A.

The History of Obstruction

One problem with determining whether lying to obtain court-appointed
counsel is obstruction is that the Sixth Amendment was not originally
understood to include a right to free counsel for indigent defendants,210
although many federal judges would in fact appoint counsel for such
defendants upon request.211 If counsel was appointed as a charity, and not as
a right, then it seems unlikely that defendants would pretend they could not
afford an attorney in hopes of getting free representation. Still, the history of
obstruction of justice prohibitions can shed light on whether the adjustment
is about protecting the justice system itself or ensuring that justice prevails—
that is, that the guilty are punished.
207

See Obstruction of Justice, HIST., https://www.history.com/topics/usgovernment/obstruction-of-justice (Aug. 21, 2018). This web page focuses on the political
side of obstruction, beginning by stating:
Obstruction of justice is a criminal charge that is used to bring down
politicians and other public officials—elected or appointed—who have
knowingly attempted to disrupt criminal proceedings or otherwise
interfere with the workings of the criminal justice system. Obstruction
statutes were put in place to punish politicians and other powerful public
officials who lie or attempt to “cheat the system,” and to prevent those
transgressions from occurring.
Id. The article goes on to state that “[a]nyone who interferes with a criminal investigation, or
a criminal or civil trial, can be charged with obstruction of justice. However, its use as a
criminal charge made against public officials—judges, prosecutors, attorneys general and
elected officials—is arguably more well known.” Id.
208
See id.
209
See United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 98 (1993); United States v. Sierra-Villegas,
774 F.3d 1093, 1102–03 (6th Cir. 2014).
210
WILLIAM M. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 29–30, 32–33
(1955).
211
Id.
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If obstruction of justice is merely any attempt to get out of the punishment
for one’s crimes, then obstruction is as old as crime itself.212 Even the broad
scope of the Sentencing Guidelines, though, does not pretend to include all
such attempts in its definition, as made clear by the examples in the
commentary.213 In historic common-law England, when many felonies were
punishable by death214 and there was no right to testify on one’s own behalf,215
the opportunity for the accused to obstruct justice and the incentive to avoid
doing so were both minimal. Likewise, there was little reason to try a person
convicted of a capital offense for the additional crime of obstruction. The
nature of the administration of justice, though, has always provided a reason
to outlaw obstruction when perpetrated by third parties or the authorities.
The term “obstruction of justice” has been used historically to refer to
misconduct by those in authority.216 In the mid-seventeenth century, the
Virginia Assembly published an authoritative collection of the laws of the
colony, claiming that “the acts of Assembly of this country through
multiplicitie of alterations and repeales are become so difficult, that the course
of justice is thereby obstructed and those that are by the lawes intrusted with
power to execute them, may by such their uncertainety be drawne to comit
unwilled errors.”217 Here, obstruction of justice was accomplished not by an
individual criminal, but by those in power who enacted a multiplicity of laws
and failed to provide citizens with adequate notice of the laws. The term was
used to denote the improper use of political power, foreshadowing today’s
association of the term with the corruption of public officials.
The most famous early historic charge of obstruction of justice is probably
that levied against King George III in the Declaration of Independence. The
Signers claimed that the King had “obstructed the Administration of Justice,
by refusing his Assent to Laws for establishing Judiciary powers.”218 The
Signers also alleged that the King had “endeavoured to prevent the
212

When Cain killed his brother Abel, becoming the first murderer, he gave this evasive
answer when God questioned him about Abel’s whereabouts: “I know not: Am I my
brother's keeper?” Genesis 4:9 (King James).
213
See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1 cmt. n.5 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
214
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *18.
215
Mary Bell Hammerman, A Criminal Defendant’s Constitutional Right to Testify—The
Implications of United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 23 VILL. L. REV. 678, 680 (1978).
216
See generally THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 10 (U.S. 1776); 1 WILLIAM
HENING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM
THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619; PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO AN ACT OF
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA 432 (1823).
217
1 HENING, supra note 216, at 432 (1823) (emphasis added) (original spelling retained).
218
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 10 (U.S. 1776).
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population of these States; for that purpose obstructing the Laws for
Naturalization of Foreigners; refusing to pass others to encourage their
migrations hither, and raising the conditions of new Appropriations of
Lands.”219 Here again, the charge was political in nature and raised against a
person in a position of governmental authority.
But the concept of obstruction of justice was not limited to those in
authority. In his Commentaries on the Law of England, Sir William
Blackstone discussed twenty-two categories of offenses against public justice,
some of which could be categorized as obstruction of justice today.220 These
crimes were embezzling, vacating, or falsifying records or court proceedings
or impersonation;221 using duress to force a prisoner in one’s custody to
testify against someone else; obstructing the execution of process; escaping
from custody; breaking out of prison; rescuing someone from prison;
returning from forced transportation to a colony; taking a reward for
returning stolen goods; receiving stolen goods; agreeing not to prosecute in
exchange for the return of stolen goods; barretry222 or suing on behalf of a
fictitious plaintiff; maintenance;223 champerty;224 taking money from a
defendant to drop a criminal matter; conspiring to indict an innocent person
of a felony; perjury and subornation of perjury; bribery; embracery;225
returning a false verdict as a juror; negligence in performing the duties of a
219

Id. para. 9.
4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 214, at *127–41.
221
Id. at *128 (“[T]o acknowlege [sic] any fine, recovery, deed enrolled, statute,
recognizance, bail, or judgment, in the name of another person not privy to the same, is
felony without benefit of clergy. . . . [T]o personate any other person . . . before any judge of
assize or other commissioner authorized to take bail in the country, is also felony.”).
222
“Common barretry is the offence of frequently exciting and stirring up suits and
quarrels between his majesty’s subjects, either at law or otherwise.” Id. at *134.
223
Maintenance is “[i]mproper assistance in prosecuting or defending a lawsuit given to a
litigant by someone who has no bona fide interest in the case; meddling in someone else’s
litigation.” Maintenance, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
224
Champerty is:
220

An agreement between an officious intermeddler in a lawsuit and a
litigant by which the intermeddler helps pursue the litigant’s claim as
consideration for receiving part of any judgment proceeds; specif., an
agreement to divide litigation proceeds between the owner of the litigated
claim and a party unrelated to the lawsuit who supports or helps enforce
the claim.
Champerty, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
225
“Embracery is an attempt to influence a jury corruptly to one side by promises,
persuasions, entreaties, money, entertainments, and the like.” 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 214,
at *140.
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public office; oppression and partiality on the part of judges; and extortion
perpetrated by a public officer.226
Eight of these offenses against public justice could only be perpetrated by
someone other than the offender in the underlying matter, and in some cases
they could only be perpetrated by someone in a position of power. Notably,
intentionally allowing a prisoner to escape from custody and rescuing
someone from prison were only punishable if the person escaping was later
convicted of the underlying offense,227 and presumably this rule would extend
to bar punishment of the escaping prisoner if he were later determined to be
innocent. If these offenses against public justice were intended to include all
offenses against the justice system, then it would make no sense to exclude
prison breaks, which certainly cost the justice system the time and money
involved in apprehending the fleeing suspect. It seems, then, that England
was interested in punishing attempts to help defendants elude punishment
only when such attempts, if successful, would actually obstruct justice itself,
not merely the justice system.
It appears that some of the offenses in the Commentaries, such as
obstructing process, maintenance, and champerty, were criminalized to
protect the justice system.228 Certain aspects of the justice system, though,
require respect if justice, in terms of punishment of the wrongdoer and
vindication of the innocent, is to be achieved. Obstructing process was
probably outlawed because the justice system is held to be the most accurate
way of achieving justice. Maintenance, barretry, and champerty could
negatively affect the justice system by clogging the courts with pointless suits,
but Blackstone’s rationale for why maintenance was banned had more to do
with the concept of justice.229 Blackstone said that maintenance “is an offence
against public justice, as it keeps alive strife and contention, and perverts the
remedial process of the law into an engine of oppression.”230 This rationale
could have applied to barretry, as well. Furthermore, offenses that would have
relieved the strain on the justice system, such as agreeing not to prosecute a
theft in exchange for the return of the stolen item or dropping a criminal suit,
were still considered offenses against public justice because they allowed the
criminal to escape punishment.
Of course, perjury was considered an offense against public justice, and

226
227
228
229
230

Id. at *128–41.
Id. at *130–31.
See id. at *129, *134–36.
See id. at *135.
Id.
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lying under oath about one’s assets can constitute perjury.231 Still, according
to Blackstone, perjury occurs “when the suit is past it’s [sic] commencement,
and come to trial”232 and “must be in some point material to the question in
dispute; for if it only be in some trifling collateral circumstance; to which no
regard is paid, it is no more penal than in . . . voluntary extrajudicial oaths.”233
The Eleventh Circuit held that materiality is met when the lie is told to get a
court-appointed attorney because the question in dispute is whether the
defendant qualifies for a court-appointed attorney, not whether the
defendant is guilty.234 But even though the commentary to the Sentencing
Guidelines lists perjury as an example of obstruction, perjury should
constitute obstruction only if it actually fits under the guideline itself because,
as noted above, the examples are not conclusive evidence that conduct is
obstruction.235
Perjury in Blackstone’s era is best understood as an offense against public
justice because of its tendency to pervert justice being served and not because
it interfered with the justice system, as evidenced by the materiality
requirement that has survived in present statutes.236 If the goal were to
prevent obstruction of the justice system, it would seem that all lies told under
oath, or all lies material to a court proceeding, would have been considered
offenses against public justice, as they could cause officers of the court to
waste time needlessly investigating. False statements about assets may be
material to an advisement proceeding and thus constitute perjury, but
because the examples in the Sentencing Guidelines’s commentary are not
conclusive, perjury itself should be considered obstruction under the
adjustment only when the defendant “willfully obstructed or impeded, or
attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect
to the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of
conviction.”237 A view of obstruction of justice that focuses on justice itself,
rather than the justice system, seems to fit with Blackstone’s view of offenses
against public justice. Even the Supreme Court has noted that “the ordinary
task of trial courts is to sift true from false testimony,” so when obstruction
was punished under courts’ contempt power, “the problem caused by simple
perjury was not so much an obstruction of justice as an expected part of its
231
232
233
234
235
236
237

18 U.S.C. § 1621 and 18 U.S.C. § 1623 punish only “material” false statements.
4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 214, at *137.
Id.
United States v. Ruff, 79 F.3d 123, 126 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
See supra Sections III.B, III.C.
See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 214, at *137; 18 U.S.C. § 1621; 18 U.S.C. § 1623.
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
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administration.”238
In 1909, Congress “codified, revised, and amended” the federal penal
laws.239 In a manner reminiscent of Blackstone’s catalog, Chapter Six of the
act was titled “Offenses Against Public Justice” and contained twenty-two
sections.240 The first section was a broad prohibition of perjury, with only the
familiar requirements of willfulness, materiality, and knowledge of the
statement’s falsity, and the second was a prohibition of subornation of
perjury.241 Section 135 of the Act, titled “Intimidation or corruption of
witness, or grand or petit juror, or officer,”242 which was similar to a federal
prohibition enacted in 1872,243 stated:
Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any
threatening letter or communication, shall endeavor to
influence, intimidate or impede any witness, in any court of
the United States . . . or who corruptly or by threats or force,
or by any threatening letter or communication, shall
influence, obstruct, or imepde [sic], or endeavor to
influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of
justice therein, shall be fined not more than one thousand
dollars, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.244
These three sections were the only ones that could be understood to cover

238
239
240
241
242
243

United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 93 (1993).
Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, 35 Stat. 1088 (1909).
Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, §§ 125–146, 35 Stat. 1088, 1111 (1909).
Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, §§ 125–126, 35 Stat. 1088, 1111 (1909).
Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 135, 35 Stat. 1088, 1111 (1909).
See Act of June 10, 1872, ch. 420, 17 Stat. 378 (1872).
[t]hat if any person or persons shall corruptly, or by threats or force, or
by threatening letters, or any threatening communications, endeavor to
influence, intimidate, or impede any grand or petit jury or juror of any
court of the United States, in the discharge of his or their duty, or shall
corruptly, or by threats or force, or by threatening letters, or any
threatening communications, influence, obstruct, or impede, or endeavor
to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice
therein, such person or persons so offending shall be liable to prosecution
therefor by indictment, and shall, on conviction thereof, be punished by
fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not
exceeding one year, or by both, according to the aggravation of the
offence.

Id.
244

Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 135, 35 Stat. 1088, 1113 (1909).
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lying to obtain counsel245 (if indigent defendants had been entitled to free
counsel at the time). The remaining eighteen sections of Chapter Six dealt
with other forms of conduct; twelve sections discussed conduct that could
only have been committed by someone other than the defendant in the
underlying proceeding or potential proceeding,246 which hearkens back to
both the Commentaries and early uses of the term “obstruction of justice.”
The prohibitions on perjury and subornation of perjury would perhaps
have covered lying about assets, but as noted above, that fact is not sufficient
to bring the lies under the umbrella of obstruction of justice. The sentence
adjustment is for obstruction of justice, not perjury, and even though perjury
is given as an example, the commentary’s examples are an inconclusive guide,
not a suggestion that the plain language of the guideline is inconsequential.
For the adjustment to apply, there must be either willful obstruction or an
attempt to obstruct or impede.
Section 135 could be understood to include conduct such as lying about
assets, but in light of the context, it seems the statute was intended more to
prevent bribery, as opposed to perjury. This is so because the first part was
directed at those who tamper with witnesses through threats, force, or
corruption.247 “Corruptly” is defined as “[i]n a corrupt or depraved manner;
by means of corruption or bribery.”248 Black’s Law Dictionary further states
that “[a]s used in criminal-law statutes, corruptly usu[ally] indicates a
wrongful desire for pecuniary gain or other advantage.”249 In the first part
of § 135, “corruptly” could only mean some type of bribery or extortion,
because the defendant was accomplishing the obstruction through a
witness.250 However, the language in the first part of the statute is parallel to
the language in the second part, which prevents obstruction of the due
245

See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, §§ 125–126, 135, 35 Stat. 1088, 1111, 1113 (1909).
See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, 35 Stat. 1088, 1111 (1909). The remaining sections
were entitled: “Stealing or altering process; procuring false bail, etc.”; “Destroying, etc.,
public records”; “Destroying records by officer in charge”; “Forging signature of judge, etc.”;
“Bribery of a judge or judicial officer”; “Judge or judicial officer accepting a bribe, etc.”;
“Juror, referee, master, etc., or judicial officer, etc., accepting bribe”; “Witness accepting
bribe”; “Intimidation or corruption of witness; or grand or petit juror, or officer;
“Conspiring to intimidate party, witness, or juror”; “Attempt to influence juror”; “Allowing
prisoner to escape”; “Application of preceding section” (on allowing a prisoner to escape);
“Obstructing process or assaulting an officer”; “Rescuing, etc., prisoner; concealing; etc.,
person for whom warrant has issued”; “Rescue at execution”; “Rescue of prisoner”; “Rescue
of body of executed offender”; “Extortion by informer”; and “Misprision of felony.” Id.
247
See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 135, 35 Stat. 1088, 1113 (1909).
248
Corruptly, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
249
Id.
250
See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 135, 35 Stat. 1088, 1113 (1909).
246
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administration of justice.251 Corruption probably has the same sense in the
second part of the statute, where it is once again placed alongside threats and
force.252 This parallelism suggests that “corruptly” in the second part has the
same meaning as that in the first part, which would require the defendant to
exercise or attempt to exercise some kind of influence on external actors
through conduct such as bribery or extortion. The second clause was perhaps
intended to cover all situations in which a defendant tried to bribe or harm a
judge, prosecutor, or bailiff, not necessarily all corrupt conduct affecting the
justice system.
Thus, historically, obstruction of justice seems to have referred more to
obstruction of the concept of justice, rather than the justice system. Lying
about one’s assets to obtain a free attorney does not fit squarely into the
historic understanding.
B.

Obstruction as a Criminal Offense Today

There are similarities between historic views of obstruction and
obstruction in today’s United States Code. Some of the language from § 135
is now found in 18 U.S.C. § 1503, which states:
Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any
threatening letter or communication, endeavors to
influence, intimidate, or impede any grand or petit juror, or
officer in or of any court of the United States, or officer who
may be serving at any examination or other proceeding
before any United States magistrate judge or other
committing magistrate, in the discharge of his duty, or
injures any such grand or petit juror in his person or
property on account of any verdict or indictment assented
to by him, or on account of his being or having been such
juror, or injures any such officer, magistrate judge, or other
committing magistrate in his person or property on account
of the performance of his official duties, or corruptly or by
threats or force, or by any threatening letter or
communication, influences, obstructs, or impedes, or
endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due
administration of justice, shall be punished as provided in
subsection (b).253

251
252
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See id.
See id.
18 U.S.C. § 1503(a).
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This statute has been interpreted as requiring an intent to obstruct, and “[t]he
action taken by the accused must be with an intent to influence judicial or
grand jury proceedings; it is not enough that there be an intent to influence
some ancillary proceeding.”254 The Supreme Court has held that lying to an
investigator is not necessarily obstruction because the defendant’s “endeavor
must have the ‘natural and probable effect’ of interfering with the due
administration of justice.”255 The Court did not hold that the entirety of the
potential investigation was within the concept of the administration of
justice.256 Thus, if the intent in the “omnibus”257 obstruction statute must be
more specific than just an intent to influence some part of an investigation,
then the intent in an adjustment that specifically requires a willful act should
be similarly understood.
In some ways, federal obstruction statutes may focus more on the justice
system than historic statutes might have. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 1512
states:
Whoever knowingly uses intimidation, threatens or
corruptly persuades another person, or attempts to do so, or
engages in misleading conduct toward another person, with
intent to . . . hinder, delay, or prevent the communication to
a law enforcement officer or judge of the United States of
information relating to the commission or possible
commission of a Federal offense . . . shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.258
At first this statute seems to break with the “concept of justice” definition of
obstruction of justice, because a person can be guilty of violating this statute
even if there was really no underlying offense. But in reality, the statute was
probably designed merely to punish successful attempts at obstruction—
those that result in a witness refusing to testify and a consequent acquittal of
a guilty party. If an actual, rather than possible, commission were required,
254

United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 599 (1995).
Id. (quoting United States v. Wood, 6 F.3d 692, 695 (10th Cir. 1993)).
256
Id.; Marinello v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1101, 1106 (2018) (“The word
‘administration’ can be read literally to refer to every ‘[a]ct or process of administering’
including every act of ‘managing’ or ‘conduct[ing]’ any ‘office,’ or ‘performing the executive
duties of’ any ‘institution, business, or the like.’ But the whole phrase—the due
administration of the Tax Code—is best viewed, like the due administration of justice, as
referring to only some of those acts or to some separable parts of an institution or business.”
(citation omitted)).
257
Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 597.
258
18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3) (emphasis added).
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then it would be difficult to punish the recalcitrant witness without first
proving that the acquitted guilty party was in fact guilty. The statute further
provides:
If the offense under this section occurs in connection with
a trial of a criminal case, the maximum term of
imprisonment which may be imposed for the offense shall
be the higher of that otherwise provided by law or the
maximum term that could have been imposed for any
offense charged in such case.259
This heightened punishment demonstrates that, although the net is cast wide
enough to catch some otherwise innocent defendants who interfere with
witnesses, the legislative intent is to prevent the guilty from escaping
punishment when acquitted due to obstruction.
Furthermore, federal code provisions that seem to punish obstruction of
the justice system are perhaps best understood as attempts to punish
obstruction of what the Second Circuit called “the search for justice in the
instant offense.”260 Certain aspects of the justice system are essential to
bringing about a just result. Statutes that protect whistleblowers from
retaliation,261 witnesses from harassment,262 process servers from assault,263
extradition agents from resistance,264 and juries from eavesdropping265 are
necessary to protect the search for justice—not just the justice system. Lying
to obtain a court-appointed attorney, though, has little to do with the search
for justice. Even if certain statutes require only the intent to obstruct the
system, the guideline does not clearly indicate that the intent need only be to
obstruct the system. Defendants who lie in such situations are intending to
get free representation, not “prevent justice or even delay it.”266
C.

Obstruction under the Guidelines

When it initially formulated the Sentencing Guidelines, the Sentencing
Commission was, in certain areas, effectuating specific directives of Congress
as outlined in either the Sentencing Reform Act or the legislative history of
259

18 U.S.C. § 1512(j).
United States v. Khimchiachvili, 372 F.3d 75, 80 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting United States
v. Zagari, 111 F.3d 307, 328 (2d Cir. 1997)).
261
18 U.S.C. § 1514A.
262
18 U.S.C. § 1512.
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18 U.S.C. § 1501.
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that Act.267 The adjustment for obstruction of justice, though, was not based
on either Congress’s directive or the legislative history of that directive.268
Instead, it was based on the Commission’s understanding of past sentencing
practices.269 In effect, it might be best to understand the Commission’s
creation of the adjustment as an attempt to label wrongful conduct that
judges were already considering in their sentencing.270 Still, by choosing the
label “obstructing or impeding the administration of justice” and by
including violations of federal obstruction statutes in the examples of
obstruction,271 the Commission insinuated that the criminal law should serve
as a guide on close questions where both the plain language and the examples
are inconclusive. As noted above, the federal code is perhaps best understood
as protecting the concept of justice or the search for justice, rather than the
justice system, because the provisions that protect the system appear
designed to protect the search.272 Even if a particular statute expands the
concept to include conduct intended to obstruct more mundane aspects of
the justice system, this interpretation should not be applied to a broadlyworded guideline that is already understood to include every type of
obstruction of justice criminalized in the federal code.273
The Supreme Court has noted, however, that the sentencing phase is
different from the guilt-determining phase:
The commission of perjury is of obvious relevance in this
regard, because it reflects on a defendant’s criminal history,
on her willingness to accept the commands of the law and
the authority of the court, and on her character in general.
Even on the assumption that we could construe a sentencing
guideline in a manner inconsistent with its accompanying
commentary, the fact that the meaning ascribed to the
phrase “obstruction of justice” differs in the contempt and
sentencing contexts would not be a reason for rejecting the
Sentencing Commission’s interpretation of that phrase. In
all events, the Commission’s interpretation is contested by
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Newton & Sidhu, supra note 4, at 1185–87.
Id. at 1286–87; see also Elizabeth T. Lear, Double Jeopardy, the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, and the Subsequent-Prosecution Dilemma, 60 BROOKLYN L. REV. 725, 751 (1994).
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neither party to this case.274
Although the Court deferred to the Sentencing Commission’s interpretation
of obstruction in the commentary, it did not decide that the commentary’s
examples would always be conclusive. Moreover, the Court seemed to
contemplate a limit on the idea that perjury is obstruction, saying that “[t]he
district court’s determination that enhancement is required is sufficient”
when “the court makes a finding of an obstruction of, or impediment to,
justice that encompasses all of the factual predicates for a finding of
perjury.”275 The Court further noted that the district court had made that
finding by stating:
The court finds that the defendant was untruthful at trial
with respect to material matters in this case. By virtue of her
failure to give truthful testimony on material matters that
were designed to substantially affect the outcome of the case,
the court concludes that the false testimony at trial warrants
an upward adjustment by two levels.276
Interestingly, the Court emphasized the lower court’s finding that the perjury
would affect the outcome of the case, which would not be true of a lie told to
get a court-appointed attorney.
Numerous arguments have been advanced to support the proposition that
lying about assets is obstruction: that the plain language of the guideline and
the examples include such lies, that public policy supports inclusion so as to
preserve resources for truly indigent defendants, and that defendants should
be held accountable for lying.277 But the plain language of the guideline is only
conclusive if the administration of justice is synonymous with the justice
system and the Commission is intending to punish obstruction of the system
rather than just corrupt attempts to avoid punishment. Additionally, while it
is true that lying about assets wastes public resources278 and is, as the Second
Circuit has said, “reprehensible,”279 these facts alone do not make such
conduct obstruction. All perjury can be considered “reprehensible,” but that
does not make it obstructive. Courts and prosecutors can deter these lies in
274

United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 94 (1993).
Id. at 95.
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ways that do not involve stretching the definition of obstruction. They can
charge these defendants with perjury,280 require repayment of the amount of
the attorney’s fees,281 or consider the conduct when making the overall
sentencing decision.282 Society has a strong interest in deterring all manner
of evils, but that interest is not sufficient to bring all manner of evils under
umbrella statutes that do not neatly cover such conduct.
Obstruction of justice has the potential for abuse when charged as a
distinct crime because it can be understood to cover such a broad range of
conduct,283 and the rule of lenity has been urged as a possible solution to that
problem.284 If the rule of lenity applies to statutes enacted by legislatures, it
should be applied more strongly to a sentencing guideline promulgated by
an unelected body whose intent matters less than the intent of the
legislature.285 Lenity is especially important because the punishment imposed
is based not on a jury’s verdict,286 but on a judge’s findings by a
preponderance of the evidence.287
Furthermore, the Sentencing Guidelines commentary’s examples of
conduct that does not constitute obstruction suggest that the guideline
280
281

See 18 U.S.C. § 1621.
18 U.S.C. § 3006A(c) states:
If at any time after the appointment of counsel the United States
magistrate judge or the court finds that the person is financially able to
obtain counsel or to make partial payment for the representation, it may
terminate the appointment of counsel or authorize payment as provided
in subsection (f), as the interests of justice may dictate.

18 U.S.C. § 3006A(f) further provides:
Whenever the United States magistrate judge or the court finds that
funds are available for payment from or on behalf of a person furnished
representation, it may authorize or direct that such funds be paid to the
appointed attorney, to the bar association or legal aid agency or
community defender organization which provided the appointed
attorney . . . .
282
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should be understood to refer to obstruction of the concept of justice, rather
than the justice system. For example, “avoiding or fleeing from arrest” not
only imposes a burden on the justice system but is also an attempt to avoid
justice altogether, and yet it is not ordinarily considered obstruction.288 The
commentary provides that “making false statements, not under oath, to law
enforcement officers” is not obstruction unless the statements “significantly
obstructed or impeded the official investigation or prosecution of the instant
offense,”289 even though the primary motivation for making such false
statements is probably to avoid punishment, and the guideline itself clearly
indicates that an attempt to obstruct is ordinarily punishable.290 In the same
way, “providing a false name or identification document at arrest” is not
obstruction unless it significantly hinders the investigation,291 just as
“providing incomplete or misleading information, not amounting to a
material falsehood, in respect to a presentence investigation” is also not
obstruction.292 If the examples themselves exclude conduct that obstructs
both the justice system and justice itself, it seems that conduct that obstructs
only the system while leaving intact the offender’s accountability for the
underlying offense should not be considered obstruction.
V. CONCLUSION
There is no definitive answer to whether the Sentencing Commission
intended the obstruction of justice adjustment to cover lying to obtain courtappointed counsel. In light of the history of obstruction of justice and in the
absence of conclusive evidence in the guideline or the commentary, courts
should exercise caution and decline to further expand an already broad
adjustment. Because the goal of the Sentencing Guidelines is uniformity, and
because application of the obstruction adjustment can have a significant
effect on an offender’s sentence, the Sentencing Commission should consider
resolving this circuit split in favor of a restrictive interpretation.
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